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In a pair of recent essays,1 William Lane Craig has leveled a series of 
objections to certain open theist understandings of the nature of the future. 
Most prominent, perhaps, has been his complaint that bivalent accounts of 
the alethic openness of the future2—such as those promoted by Gregory 
Boyd, Alan Rhoda, and Thomas Belt3—which construe “will” and “will not” 
propositions as being contradicted by statements asserting what “might not” 
and “might” occur are, in each case, both semantically and modally con-
fused. “Boyd,” Craig specifically notes, “proposes a reform of the English 
language according to which the contradictory of ‘x will occur’ is ‘x might 
not occur,’ and the contradictory of ‘x will not occur’ is ‘x might occur.’ The 
statements ‘x will occur’ and ‘x will not occur’ are on this view contraries, 
not contradictories.”4
aBsTraCT: In a pair of recent essays, William Lane Craig has argued that certain open theist 
understandings of the nature of the future are both semantically and modally confused. I argue 
that this is not the case and show that, if consistently observed, the customary semantics for 
counterfactuals Craig relies on not only undermine the validity of his complaint against the open 
theist, they actually support an argument for the openness position.
1. William Lane Craig, “God Directs All Things: On Behalf of a Molinist View of Provi-
dence,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zonder-
van, 2011), 79–100; and “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, 
224–30. Cf. Craig and David P. Hunt, “Perils of the Open Road,” Faith and Philosophy 30 
(2013): 49–71.
2. According to Alan Rhoda, the future is alethically open at time t if and only if for some 
state of affairs x and some future time t* (i) neither <x will obtain at t*> nor <x will not obtain 
at t*> is true at t and (ii) neither of their tense-neutral counterparts, <x does obtain at t*> and <x 
does not obtain at t*>, is true simpliciter. See Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness of the Future,” 
in God in an Open Universe: Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism, ed. William Hasker, 
Thomas Jay Oord, and Dean Zimmerman (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), 74.
3. See Gregory Boyd, “Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively 
Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment,” Religious Stud-
ies 46 (2010): 52–5. Cf. Rhoda, Boyd, and Belt, “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of 
the Future,” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006): 432–59.
4. Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” 229. For an early proponent of the idea that 
“will” and “will not” statements are actually contraries rather than contradictories, see Charles 
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Depicted on a square of opposition, these logical relations appear as 
follows.
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Figure 1.
For open theists, the above picture illustrates how it’s possible for the 
future to be a realm of both settled and unsettled aspects. That is, instead 
of ultimately being describable in terms of what will or will not take place, 
the future may also be comprised of that which has yet to be written into 
the “storyline” of world history—a realm of what still might and might not 
occur.
These ontological possibilities form a distinct category apart from truths 
about what will and will not happen and are what the aforementioned sub-
contraries, when expressed conjointly, are meant to represent. Indeed, it is 
the open theist’s conviction that this tripartite division of logical space pro-
vides the best representation of the future in a world where genuine inde-
terminism exists. And since, like their Molinist and Arminian brethren, it is 
also the open theist’s conviction that we have been granted a degree of inde-
terministic or “libertarian” freedom, such theists are convinced that figure 1 
presents the best depiction of the future in our world.5
Craig, however, isn’t buying it. His primary complaint about this open 
future square of opposition is that such a picture illicitly mixes modal lo-
cutions (“might” statements) with nonmodal locutions (“will” statements). 
According to Craig,
Hartshorne, “The Meaning of ‘Is Going to Be,’” Mind 74 (1965): 46–58.
5. For further defense of the logical relations that appear on figure 1, see Elijah Hess, “Neo-
Molinism and the Open Future Square of Opposition: A Defense,” Sophia (forthcoming). In-
deed, if figure 1 can be defended as logically coherent, then there are possible worlds in which 
the future is partly open. Moreover, since God is a necessary being, he inhabits such worlds and 
knows the future(s) there as such. Thus there is nothing inherently inconsistent in supposing that 
a maximally perfect being faces a partly open future.
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He [Boyd] is speaking his own idiolect here. . . . In normal English, 
the statement that something will occur, but might not occur, is per-
fectly coherent. That is just to affirm that it will occur contingently. 
Boyd must be assuming that ‘will’ statements are disguised modal 
statements to the effect that something ‘must’ occur and so can be set 
in opposition to ‘might’ statements.6
In what follows I’ll argue that, contrary to Craig, all that open theists 
need to arrive at the opposition between “will” and “might not” (and, simi-
larly, “will not” and “might”) is to show that these indicatives are simply re-
lated to a certain class of conditional statement. After laying the groundwork 
for this relation, I demonstrate how Craig’s attacks on Boyd’s so-called neo-
Molinist understanding of might-statements can be turned and used, instead, 
as an argument in support of the open theist’s view of the future. I conclude 
by considering three objections to the argument and note that, in their at-
tempts to block it, traditional Molinists like Craig have revealed that they 
are operating with a far more attenuated account of free will than many have 
realized—an account that may end up inadvertently providing a libertarian 
with considerable incentive to move from Molinism to neo-Molinism.
Preliminaries
To start, then, consider how the traditional Molinist views reality. “In the 
Molinist view,” Craig writes,
there are two logical moments prior to the divine decree: first, the 
moment at which God has natural knowledge of the range of possible 
worlds and, second, the moment at which he has knowledge of the 
proper subset of possible worlds that, given the counterfactual propo-
sitions true at that moment, are feasible for him to create. The counter-
factuals which are true at that moment thus serve to delimit the range 
of possible worlds to worlds feasible for God.7
Hence, according to the Molinist picture (allowing circles to represent 
possible worlds), the logical “moments” at which the various stages of God’s 
knowledge occur fall in this order:
6. Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” 229.
7. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 82–3.
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Moment 1: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Natural Knowledge: God knows what could be the case.
Moment 2: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Middle Knowledge: God knows what would be the case.
God’s creative decree
Moment 3: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Free Knowledge: God knows what will be the case.
Figure 2.
This picture is the key to seeing how, on the Molinist’s understanding, future-
tense indicatives are logically related to certain other conditional terms. In 
particular, future-tense indicatives stand in a definite relation to counterfac-
tual terms. Moreover there are open theists who, to a large extent, agree with 
the Molinist picture. So-called neo-Molinist accounts of open theism, like 
those advocated by Boyd, also conceive of God’s precreational knowledge 
in two stages.8 On the traditional as well as the neo-Molinist model, for any 
true “will” proposition in the actual world there is a corresponding “would” 
counterfactual proposition that logically preceded it and was known by God 
via his middle knowledge. However, just as the neo-Molinist will insist—
over and against other classical theists—that the future is alethically open 
and thus ultimately apprehended by God via his free knowledge in terms of 
what “will,” “will not,” and (in the case of future contingents) what “might 
and might not” occur, here too neo- and traditional Molinists will ultimately 
divide over the content of God’s middle knowledge.
For instance, when considering so-called counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom (CCFs hereafter), traditional Molinists ultimately acknowledge just 
two categories of counterfactual conditional in God’s middle knowledge, 
would-counterfactuals and would not-counterfactuals. That is, they endorse 
the law of conditional excluded middle (CEM)—the claim that, for any coun-
terfactual P □→ Q (read: “If P were the case, Q would be the case”), either 
(P □→ Q) or (P □→ ¬Q) is true. The law is notoriously controversial,9 but 
8. Boyd, “Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God,” Philosophia Christi 5 (2003): 
187–204. For a brief explication and defense of the “stages” of God’s knowledge on the neo-
Molinist model, see the ensuing discussion below.
9. Though, for various defenses of CEM, see Charles B. Cross, “Conditional Excluded 
Middle,” Erkenntnis 70 (2009): 173–88; Richard Gaskin, “Conditionals of Freedom and Middle 
eliJah hess 335
it would appear the traditional Molinist is committed to something like it, at 
least when the species of counterfactual is a CCF. For as Craig points out, 
since the circumstances C in which the free agent is placed are fully speci-
fied in the counterfactual’s antecedent, it would seem that if the agent were 
placed in C and left free with respect to action x, then she must either do x or 
not do x. “For what other alternative,” Craig wonders, “is there?”10
Whereas the traditional Molinist posits only two logically distinct cate-
gories of counterfactual pertaining to the hypothetical actions of creatures at 
this moment in the divine mind (that is, “would” and “would not” condition-
als), the neo-Molinist allows for three—namely “would,” “would not,” and 
“might and might not.” And it is specifically the latter sort of proposition that 
the neo-Molinist maintains is needed to properly express CCFs. Indeed, the 
neo-Molinist account of middle knowledge is unique in that it distinguishes 
between volitional and creational aspects of God’s activity in relation to the 
divine knowledge. By “volitional” activity, the neo-Molinist means to refer 
to activity that depends on God’s will. Relatedly, when speaking of “cre-
ational” activity, she means to refer to activity in which God produces (or 
instantiates) concrete and material effects. In this way, the latter implies the 
former but not vice versa. Middle knowledge, on the neo-Molinist scheme 
then, is between natural and free knowledge in that it is precreational—that 
is, prior to creation (like natural knowledge but unlike free knowledge), but 
also volitional and, hence, dependent on God’s will (like free knowledge and 
unlike natural knowledge). Here’s how the “neological” stages in the divine 
mind proceed.11
In God’s natural knowledge, an individual creaturely essence I is known, 
necessarily, as a mere possibility (◇I & ¬I). God also knows what such es-
sences could do in any situation they might be in. For example, Adam could 
eat the forbidden fruit, or he could refrain from eating it. But, necessarily, 
God knows that it’s possible that Adam eat the fruit for at least two different 
reasons: Adam could eat the fruit because he’s been determined to do so, or 
Adam could freely eat it. The same two possibilities account for how Adam 
could refrain from eating the fruit. 
In God’s middle knowledge, Adam’s essence—once a mere possibil-
ity—is willed by God to exist. It is not yet instantiated, but it has been willed 
by God to be an actual creaturely essence. Moreover, God has decided that, 
were Adam to be placed in the garden, Adam should freely decide whether 
Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1993): 412–30; Robert C. Stalnaker, “A Defense of 
Conditional Excluded Middle,” in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, ed. 
William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981), 87–104; 
and Dean A. Kowalski, “On Behalf of a Suarezian Middle Knowledge,” Philosophia Christi 5 
(2003): 219–27. For further discussion, see also note 25 below.
10. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection,” Faith and 
Philosophy 18 (2001): 338.
11. For a summary chart containing the neo-Molinist’s account of divine knowledge, see 
figure 4 included at the end of this paper.
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to eat of the forbidden fruit. Thus, God grants the capacity for libertarian 
freedom to Adam’s essence, thereby grounding the truth of the following 
counterfactual conditional: “If Adam were in the garden, he might and might 
not eat the forbidden fruit.” Because free will is a gift from God, whether an 
essence should possess such a capacity is contingent upon God’s choice and 
is, thus, dependent on God’s activity.12
At the moment of God’s creative decree, God creates ex nihilo a “world-
type,” that is, a delimited set of possible worlds, any one of which might be 
actualized depending on the choices free agents make. However, God also 
simultaneously decrees what he shall do in response to his free creatures’ 
potential choices as well as the precise range of possibilities available for 
agents to choose from on any given occasion.13
12. This idea, i.e., that God grants a (once merely possible) creaturely essence both existence 
and a capacity for free choice at this moment in the divine mind, allows the neo-Molinist to turn 
back David Werther’s charge that might-counterfactuals should be classed as necessary truths in 
God’s natural knowledge. Werther points out that a proposition like “If one possess libertarian 
freedom regarding an action in some set of circumstances then one might or might not perform 
that action” is necessarily true. However, as he goes on to note, “It is not possible that a person 
possess libertarian freedom regarding some action unless both the performing of the action and 
the refraining from its performance are possibilities. But, if this is so, then neo-Molinism’s so-
called might counterfactuals are rightly classed, along with all other necessary truths, among 
God’s natural knowledge” (Werther, “Open Theism and Middle Knowledge: An Appraisal of 
Gregory Boyd’s Neo-Molinism,” Philosophia Christi 5 (2003): 213). What Werther fails to 
realize here, however, is that it is not necessary that a creature have libertarian freedom. Since 
it is up to God whether such essences should be granted libertarian freedom, it is his decision 
that this be so that accounts for the transition from natural to middle knowledge at this point.
13. Critics of the open view often worry that, were the future “open” in the way that open 
theists suppose, God’s ultimate purposes for the cosmos could potentially be thwarted. For 
instance, Craig contends that “knowledge of mere ‘might’ counterfactuals is insufficient to give 
God the sort of specific providential control described in the Bible. Nor is it clear that such 
knowledge is sufficient to bring about God’s desired ends” (Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 
90–1). Similarly, David Hunt has claimed that the God of open theism could very well lose 
something as simple as a game of rock-paper-scissors (see Hunt, “The Providential Advantage 
of Divine Foreknowledge,” in Arguing about Religion, ed. Kevin Timpe (London: Routledge, 
2009), 374–85). However, over and against other openness models to date, the neo-Molinist 
account of divine knowledge presented here allows God a significant amount of providential 
control. For, according to the neo-Molinist, the topography of modality is largely shaped by 
God. E.g., God knows that, were he to enter into a game of rock-paper-scissors with Satan, 
he could potentially lose that game depending on what Satan plays. But God has the ultimate 
“say-so” concerning which creational “games” he enters into. So, if Satan’s winning this game 
would be detrimental to God’s overall plan, then God needn’t risk ever losing such a game with 
Satan. Without completely abrogating Satan’s freedom, God simply decides to enter into a game 
where he’s left open to Satan two rather than three options to choose from. By allowing Satan, 
say, the possibility of choosing either rock or scissors, God knows that by playing rock he’ll 
never lose this game with Satan. Indeed, as this example shows, the precise range of possibilities 
available to us is under God’s power and may vary greatly from circumstance to circumstance. 
According to the neo-Molinist, then, this ability to determine which possibilities will remain 
open to us allows God a robust level of providential control over a world in which freedom is 
thought to consist in genuine, alternative possibilities. Aspects of my account of God’s knowl-
edge and providential activity build upon a similar view put forth by Boyd. For Boyd’s “infinite 
intelligence” argument and how it relates to God’s providential control on the neo-Molinist 
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In God’s free knowledge, what were once known as might-counterfactu-
als are now known as a delimited set of might-factuals, ontological possibili-
ties that now partly comprise a future describable in terms of what “will,” 
“will not,” and “might and might not” be. God knows what contingency 
plans he’s set in place as well as the delimited set of might-factuals that he 
himself has providentially left open to instantiated creaturely essences en-
dowed with libertarian freedom to choose from.
Commenting on the neo-Molinist view of counterfactuals, Craig cor-
rectly observes that
a few openness theologians have attempted to accommodate the in-
sights of Molinism by affirming that God does have middle knowl-
edge of ‘might’ counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, even though 
he lacks middle knowledge of ‘would’ counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom. Thus, he knows logically prior to his decree what any person 
he could create might or might not do in any set of circumstances in 
which God should place him.14
“But,” Craig asks,
if ‘might’ counterfactuals can be true logically prior to God’s decree, 
then why not also ‘would’ counterfactuals? It is important to under-
stand that in the customary semantics for counterfactual condition-
als, ‘would’ counterfactuals logically imply ‘might’ counterfactuals, 
so that in the Molinist view, both are true and known to God via his 
middle knowledge.15
Here Craig wants to know what basis the neo-Molinist could have for 
denying the truth of “would” CCFs when they accept the truth of “might” 
CCFs. After all, if it’s true that I might order a pizza, then the subjunctive 
“I would order a pizza” could be true. Likewise, if it’s true that I might not 
order a pizza, then “I would not order a pizza” could be true.16 Apparently, 
the fact that might-conditionals have this implication for would-conditionals 
leads Craig to believe that the neo-Molinist’s denial of true “would” CCFs is 
unjustified. “If . . . open theists are willing to accept true ‘might’ counterfac-
tuals,” he writes, “then I see no reason remaining to deny the truth of ‘would’ 
counterfactuals as well.”17
As it turns out, however, the neo-Molinist has a very good reason for 
supposing God lacks middle knowledge of “would” CCFs, one that—despite 
what Craig’s gloss might seem to suggest—relies on an important distinction 
account of open theism, see especially his “Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God,” 
196–203; “Response to William Lane Craig,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, 136–9; and 
“Randomness and Assurance: Does Everything Happen for a Reason?,” The Other Journal 20 
(2012): 75–85.
14. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 88.
15. Ibid., 89.
16. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this example.
17. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 89.
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within standard counterfactual semantics. In the next section, I demonstrate 
what the semantic basis for neo-Molinist middle knowledge is and how the 
open future square of opposition can be derived from it.
Is the Neo-Molinist Counterfactually Confused?
We’ve seen how on both Molinism and neo-Molinism future-tense in-
dicatives like “will” and “will not” can be understood to relate to “would” 
and “would not” counterfactuals. But in order to demonstrate how the con-
tradictory relations exhibited on the open future square of opposition can, 
pace Craig, actually be derived from standard counterfactual semantics, 
we’ll need to uncover just what exactly these standard or “customary” se-
mantics for counterfactual conditionals are. As it turns out Craig and his 
colleague, philosopher J. P. Moreland, provide the answer in their remark-
able book Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. There 
they reveal that, “for want of a better alternative, most philosophers use the 
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics.”18 Named after the pioneering work of philoso-
phers Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis, the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for 
counterfactuals is a similarity-based approach to determining the truth of 
these conditionals relative to possible worlds. Lewis’s preferred model, for 
example, has us think of similarity as a “closeness” relation between worlds 
arranged into a system of spheres, $, where $ is (conceptually) structured as 
a series of concentric circles. As Lewis explains, the $ used in interpreting 
counterfactuals
is meant to carry information about the comparative overall similarity 
of worlds. Any particular sphere around a world w is to contain just 
those worlds that resemble w to at least a certain degree. This degree 
is different for different spheres around w. The smaller the sphere, the 
more similar to w must a world be to fall within it.19
As Craig and Moreland go on to elaborate, if we want to determine the 
truth of P □→ Q from, say, the perspective of the actual world W, we con-
sider the worlds in the nearest sphere centered on W in which the antecedent 
of our counterfactual is true. If in all the worlds in which the antecedent is 
true, the consequent is also true, then a “would” counterfactual is true. If in 
some of the worlds in which the antecedent is true, the consequent is also 
true, then a “might” counterfactual P ◇→ Q (read: “If P were the case, Q 
might be the case”) is true.20
18. J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 
Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003), 53.
19. David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 14. 
The “w” in the above quotation is my symbolization (Lewis uses “i”). Here and throughout, un-
less otherwise noted, I use w to represent an arbitrary world.
20. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 53.
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Now, importantly, Craig seems to think that when the neo-Molinist uses 
the modal locution “might” (or “might not”) in reference to future contin-
gents, they are doing so in a way that is fundamentally at odds with the 
way those terms are understood in the counterfactual semantics mentioned 
above. “In counterfactual discourse,” Craig avers, “‘might’ has a technical 
sense that is quite different from Boyd’s usage. Boyd uses the word to affirm 
causal indeterminism. Counterfactual discourse pairs ‘might’ with ‘would,’ 
not ‘will’ as Boyd does.”21 We’ve already seen that by “counterfactual dis-
course” Craig is referring to the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. But if “might” is 
supposed to be some kind of terminus technicus within these counterfactual 
systems, then what does it mean? How does it function? According to Craig, 
“In counterfactual logic, P ◇→  Q is simply defined as the contradictory of P 
□→ ¬Q, that is to say, as ¬(P □→ ¬Q).”22 Interestingly, by conceiving of the 
◇→  connective in this way, Craig is endorsing Lewis’s “interdefinable” ac-
count of the counterfactual operators.23 Here’s what the definitions for these 
operators, given Lewis’s approach, look like.
Lewisian interdefinability:
P ◇→  Q =def. ¬(P □→ ¬Q),
P □→ Q =def. ¬(P ◇→  ¬Q).
Based on these definitions Moreland and Craig construct what they call 
a “square of opposition for counterfactual statements”24 which is reproduced 
below.
21. Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” 228n94.
22. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 53. See also 
Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience 
(Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1991), 252, 258.
23. Lewis, Counterfactuals, 2.
24. See figure 2.3 in Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian World-
view, 53.
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Figure 3.
Notice, however, that this diagram—and the interdefinability of the coun-
terfactual connectives on which it’s based—is precisely the sort of square 
of opposition that the neo-Molinist endorses for counterfactual condition-
als. After all, it is exactly because of the logical relations shown here that 
the neo-Molinist concludes that God’s middle knowledge must contain a 
threefold division between what “would,” “would not,” and what “might and 
might not” occur.
Since the latter (conjunctive) type of proposition can stand in distinc-
tion from both “would” and “would not” counterfactuals, the neo-Molinist 
contends that, from a strictly logical point of view, God’s middle knowledge 
cannot be restricted in the way advocates of CEM suggest.25 Indeed, in sup-
port of the logical relations outlined on figure 3, Lewis tells us that
25. For the majority of Molinists, the idea that CEM holds for CCFs is upheld because such 
an idea is thought to be required for God’s providential control; hence, in the present context, 
it is primarily a theologically driven postulate. But Molinists also attempt to defend the claim 
on philosophical grounds. Craig, for example, says the idea is plausible since “we are talking 
in this case about a very special set of counterfactuals involving the choices of some agent in 
fully specified circumstances. Such restrictive parameters remove the sort of ambiguities that 
serve to support mere might-counterfactuals” (Craig, “Ducking Friendly Fire: Davison on the 
Grounding Objection,” Philosophia Christi 8 (2006): 163n4; cf. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge 
and Human Freedom, 258; and Jonathan Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1986), 146–8). Craig’s claim that CCFs can plausibly be thought to be true 
so long as the circumstances described in the antecedent are—in terms of accounting for all 
the relevant factors—“fully specified” is far from obvious however. On the contrary, given that 
these conditionals are supposed to be about the indeterministic actions of agents, sober philo-
sophical reflection would seem to suggest that no amount of (additional) information would be 
of any help in determining what are, through and through, causally indeterminate events. Dean 
Zimmerman makes the point well:
Many (I would guess most) philosophers simply do not have [Craig’s] reaction: 
when carefully attending to the causal indeterminacy of a certain outcome in cer-
tain possible circumstances that may never obtain, most of us do not find much 
plausibility in the idea that there is a definite fact about what would happen in those 
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If the ‘would’ counterfactual P □→ Q is non-vacuously true, then the 
‘might’ counterfactual P ◇→ Q also is true. If P □→ Q and its opposite 
P □→ ¬Q are both false, then P ◇→ Q and its opposite P ◇→ ¬Q are 
both true; for this is the case in which Q is true at some of the closest 
P-worlds and ¬Q is true at others of them. But when P □→ Q is false 
and its opposite P □→ ¬Q is true, Q holds at none of the closest P-
worlds and P ◇→ Q is therefore false.26
Thus while it’s true that would-counterfactuals logically imply might-coun-
terfactuals, as figure 3 illustrates, the relation is asymmetric. A true “might” 
conditional, then, could mean that its corresponding “would” conditional is 
true, but we could not infer that it is on this basis alone. So long as we’re 
adopting Lewis’s standard semantics, CEM as construed above is in trouble.
The reason is simple: Lewis’s definition of “might” places “would” and 
“would not” in a contrary rather than contradictory relation.
The preceding insights concerning the relationship between future-tense 
indicatives and counterfactuals finally allow the neo-Molinist to arrive at the 
opposition between “will” and “might not” as depicted on figure 1 by way of 
the following syllogism:
(1) x will occur ⊃ x would occur (from figure 2)
(2) x would occur ⊃ not [x might not occur] (from figure 3)
(3) x will occur ⊃ not [x might not occur] (from 1 and 2 by transitivity)
Therefore it looks as if, from premises put forward by Craig himself, we can 
arrive at a conclusion, (3), which is just an affirmation of the open theist’s 
view of the future (the same argument can be run, mutatis mutandis, for “will 
not” and “might”).
Craig’s Counterfactual Conflation
What all this points up is an important fact—CEM, on the one hand, 
and Lewis’s understanding of the counterfactual operators, on the other, 
are formally incompatible. CEM, while valid on Stalnaker’s semantics, is 
invalidated on Lewis’s definition of ◇→ . The reason is because Stalnaker 
assumes an antisymmetry constraint for the similarity relation between pos-
circumstances—at least, not a fact that could be known infallibly ahead of time. . . . 
Throwing in more and more details about the situation would strike most of us, I 
believe, as irrelevant if the details leave the situation precisely as indeterministic as 
ever. (Zimmerman, “An Anti-Molinist Replies,” in Molinism: The Contemporary 
Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 182)
Though not an open theist herself, Linda Zagzebski expresses a similar sentiment regarding 
the relation between CEM and indeterminism. See Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and 
Foreknowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 139–40.
26. Lewis, Counterfactuals, 21. For sake of uniformity, I’ve here replaced Lewis’s anteced-
ent and consequent symbolization (Φ and Ψ ) for P and Q respectively.
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sible worlds. As Theodore Sider explains, “Anti-symmetry prohibits ‘ties’—
it says that two distinct worlds cannot be at least as close to a given world w 
as the other.”27
Lewis, on the other hand, allows for ties in similarity to obtain between 
worlds (and between world segments). Hence a counterfactual describing an 
indeterministic event such as “If I had tossed the coin, it might have landed 
heads” is, as Jonathan Bennett points out, “true [on Lewis’s interpretation] 
because it means that it is not the case that if I had tossed the coin it would 
have come down tails; or, in the ‘worlds’ dialect, Toss-worlds at which the 
coin comes down heads are as close to w as any at which it comes down 
tails.”28 As such, Lewis’s semantics seem much better suited to model the 
metaphysical situation envisioned by libertarians, that is, that there are, for 
any circumstances C in which I freely choose x, other worlds in which, in the 
same C, I choose not-x instead.29
We can notice, further, how the following argument (borrowed from 
Bennett) demonstrates that, by accepting CEM and Lewisian interdefin-
ability, as Craig appears to, one actually collapses the distinction between 
“would” and “might.”
(4) (P □→ ¬Q) ∨ (P □→ Q) (CEM)
(5) ¬(P □→ ¬Q) ⊃ (P □→ Q) (from 4 by def. of “⊃”)
(6) (P ◇→ Q) ⊃ (P □→ Q) (from 5 by Lewis’s definition of “◇→ ”)
(7) (P □→ Q) ⊃ (P ◇→ Q) (obvious; entailed by Lewis’s definition)
(8) (P □→ Q) ≡ (P ◇→ Q) (from 6 and 7 by trivial logic)
27. Theodore Sider, Logic for Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 206.
28. Jonathan Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 191.
29. By saying that the Lewisian semantics better “model” the metaphysical situation en-
visioned by libertarians, I am not saying that Lewis’s semantics explain what makes counter-
factuals like “If I had tossed the coin, it might have landed heads” true. Rather, I am simply 
saying—along with Zimmerman—that the acceptance and use of these semantics has definite 
implications for what makes such propositions true. “The standard way to assign a meaning to 
the ‘nearness’ relation among worlds,” Zimmerman rightly observes, “takes a stand on what 
sorts of similarities among worlds are relevant to these truth conditions—it is not a mere blank, 
that yields equally adequate theories of the meanings of conditionals not matter how it is filled 
in. The standard interpretation provides a candidate relation. In the case of an actually existing 
coin-flipping machine, the truth or falsehood of the conditional: ‘If it were triggered at such-
and-such time, it would yield “heads,”’ must (given this choice of the ‘nearness’ relation) super-
vene upon the actual laws and the actual categorical history leading up to the time of potential 
triggering. If the machine is in a state that would, as a matter of actual lawful behavior, yield 
heads, the conditional is true. If it is in a state that, due to indeterministic actual laws, might 
yield heads or tails, standard application of the Stalnaker-Lewis truth conditions requires that 
the conditional be false. Similarly, in the case of actual indeterministic processes of choice, the 
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, with ‘nearness’ interpreted in the standard way, says that the actual 
world does not include enough facts to make the Molinist’s [CCFs] true” (Zimmerman, “An 
Anti-Molinist Replies,” 166).
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As Bennett notes, “This conclusion is patently unacceptable, so something 
must yield: either CEM or Lewis’s account of ‘might.’”30
Since the Lewisian definition of ◇→  is, as we’ve discovered, incompat-
ible with CEM, it should come as no surprise that the Molinist opts to chal-
lenge it. In order to block the neo-Molinist’s move from (1) and (2) to (3) in 
the previous argument, therefore, (2) is where the real action is. I now turn 
to consider three objections to this particular premise and the counterfactual 
square of opposition it’s predicated on.
Molinist Objections (and Neo-Molinist Replies)
Objection 1
The first objection that Craig and other Molinists are likely to raise 
against (2)—and the counterfactual square on which it’s based—is that the 
“might” in the requirement for freedom is not the same as the ◇→  counter-
factual connective. While the “might” counterfactual is technically defined 
as the negation of P □→ ¬Q so that P □→ ¬Q and P ◇→ Q are logically 
incompatible, still, the Molinist will insist, it remains true that if P were the 
case it could be the case that ¬Q. In other words, I could do otherwise, even 
if it is not the case that I might do otherwise. Craig, for instance, has pointed 
out that if one imagines “would” counterfactuals as being incompatible with 
creaturely freedom, then that person “has forgotten the difference between 
what one could do and what one might do in any set of circumstances. Free-
dom requires only that in a given set of circumstances one be in some sense 
capable of refraining from doing what one would do; it is not required that 
one might not do what one would do.”31
Reply
As Craig’s comment makes clear, the above objection is based on the 
idea that “could” and “might” ought to be construed as distinct notions of 
possibility. When properly parsed, one will see that the libertarian needn’t re-
quire Lewis’s standard account of might-counterfactuals in order to express 
and affirm a robust sense of free will. Or, so the thought goes.
This objection is unpersuasive—or at least it should be if one wants to 
uphold common libertarian assumptions. For once we uncover what the dif-
ference between these two modal terms is supposed to be, we’ll discover that 
the Molinist is operating with a far more attenuated account of freedom than 
many have realized. To see this we simply need to look again to Craig. In the 
30. Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, 189.
31. Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 89 (emphasis in original).
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very same paragraph in which he approvingly gives Lewis’s definition for 
◇→ , Craig explains the relevant difference between the notion of “could” 
on the one hand, and the “might” of counterfactual logic on the other.
‘Might’ counterfactuals should not be confused with subjunctive con-
ditionals involving the word ‘could.’ ‘Could’ is taken to express mere 
possibility and so is a constituent of a modal statement expressing a 
possible truth. The distinction is important because the fact that some-
thing could happen under certain circumstances does not imply that it 
might happen under those circumstances. ‘Might’ is more restrictive 
than ‘could’ and indicates a genuine, live option under the circum-
stances, not a bare logical possibility.32
This account of the “might” counterfactual operator, of course, follows 
Lewis’s usual usage. And it is more than a bit baffling why Craig would sup-
pose that the open theist description of causally indeterminate events in terms 
of what “might and might not” occur is at odds with it. Far from eschewing 
their differences, when the neo-Molinist affirms that an agent S might have 
done other than x—that is, might not have done x—she is expressing an 
idea that Lewis’s semantics are perfectly well-equipped to handle. She is 
saying that there are, for any circumstances C in which S freely chooses x, 
other worlds in which, in the exact same C, S chooses not-x instead. Such 
an account of freedom is what Alfred Mele has appropriately dubbed deep 
openness. As Mele puts it,
Sometimes you and I would have made an alternative decision if 
things had been a bit different. For example, if you had been in a 
slightly better mood, you might have decided to donate twenty dollars 
to a worthy cause instead of just ten. But this isn’t enough for the kind 
of openness at issue. . . . What’s needed is that more than one option 
was open to you, given everything as it actually was at the time—your 
mood, all your thoughts and feelings, your brain, your environment, 
and indeed the entire universe and its entire history. Having been able 
to have made a different decision if things had been a bit different is 
one thing; having been able to have made a different decision in the 
absence of any prior difference is another.33
Counter-Objection
It has occasionally been pointed out in the literature, however, that be-
sides his usual “not-would-not” reading of “might,” Lewis also admitted a 
“would-be-possible” reading of the ◇→ operator where “possible” means 
32. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 53 (em-
phasis added).
33. Alfred R. Mele, Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 2.
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“some minute (though nonzero) chance.”34 The idea is supposed to be that a 
counterfactual such as
(9) If it were that P, then it would not be that Q 
can be true and is compatible with 
(10) If it were that P, then there would be some chance that Q. 
But since (10) implies 
(11) If it were that P, then it might be that Q 
it would follow that (9) and (11) are compatible rather than contradictory. In 
other words, (9) is only incompatible with (11) when the “might” in (11) is 
taken as “not-would-not.” The upshot is that on the alternative “would-be-
possible” reading of (11), both (9) and (11) can be true together (similarly for 
“would” and “might not”)—thus, figure 3 would be rendered invalid.
The question, then, is whether the traditional Molinist could adopt this 
“would-be-possible” sense of “might” as an adequate reading of our liber-
tarian intuitions and in so doing deny (2) in the neo-Molinist’s argument, 
(1)–(3), above. Against those who have put forward similar arguments,35 this 
seems to be exactly what Craig’s objection is getting at. And there have been 
other Molinists who have objected to this line of reasoning in a similar fash-
ion. For example, Edward Wierenga and Thomas Flint have claimed that the 
Molinist should not agree that a situation in which an agent makes a libertar-
ian free choice with respect to doing or not doing x is a situation in which the 
agent might do x but also might not do it. “Rather,” Wierenga urges, “if an 
agent would do x if the agent were in C, then it is possible that the agent be 
in C and not do x, and there are other worlds with the same initial segment 
in which the agent is in C and does not do x.”36 Flint, too, is satisfied with 
this response and has even gone so far as to say that Wierenga has said “all 
34. This has been recognized, for instance, by Keith DeRose, “Can It Be That It Would Have 
Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 396–7; 
as well as Edwin Mares and Ken Perszyk, “Molinist Conditionals,” in Molinism, 104n12. For 
Lewis’s discussion of this alternate interpretation of “might” see his “Postscripts to ‘Counter-
factual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,’” in Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 63–5; and the appendix in Counterfactuals, 146.
35. For arguments that have attempted to show—given Lewis’s standard account of the 
might-counterfactual—that there are no true “would” CCFs, see Robert Merrihew Adams, 
“Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 
109–17; William Hasker, “A Philosophical Perspective,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical 
Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994), 
145; and Peter van Inwagen, “Against Middle Knowledge,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
21 (1997): 232.
36. Edward Wierenga, “Tilting at Molinism,” in Molinism, 136. Cf. Wierenga, The Nature 
of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 140–3. 
Again, in order to maintain uniformity with the symbols used throughout this paper, I’ve substi-
tuted “x” for Wierenga’s “A” to represent the arbitrary action of an agent.
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that needs to be said” to defuse arguments like (1)–(3) which rely on Lewis’s 
standard semantics.37
Counter-Reply
Contrary to what Craig, Wierenga, and Flint might wish however, the 
sort of possibility at issue in Lewis’s alternative reading of ◇→ is much too 
thin to capture common libertarian intuitions. Whereas, on Lewis’s usual 
“not-would-not” reading of the “might” counterfactual, (11) means that some 
of the most similar worlds where P is the case are also worlds where Q is 
the case, the “would-be-possible” reading simply means that all of them are 
worlds where it is possible for Q to happen. In fact, as Lewis points out, 
it’s only when all of them are worlds where Q is an unfulfilled possibility 
that makes the “would-be-possible” interpretation of (11) true rather than 
the “not-would-not” interpretation.38 Accordingly, the “would-be-possible” 
reading is an unattractive account of “might” for libertarians. As the quota-
tion from Wierenga above makes clear, the libertarian doesn’t just want to 
affirm that there’s “some minute chance that Q” when that possibility is un-
derstood to be so thin as to never actually obtain in any of the nearest worlds. 
Thus for Molinists like Craig, Wierenga, and Flint, the alternative “would-
be-possible” interpretation of the might-counterfactual is unavailable if they 
want to maintain that it is both (i) possible that a free agent be in C and not do 
x, and that (ii) there are other worlds with the same initial segment in which 
the agent is in C and does not do x.
I conclude, therefore, that—contra Craig—the neo-Molinist has not 
“forgotten the difference between what one could do and what one might do 
in any set of circumstances.” In contrast to the traditional Molinist who re-
jects the standard account of ◇→  in favor of a “bare possibility” interpreta-
tion, the neo-Molinist is upholding the mainstream libertarian intuition that, 
under any circumstances in which we freely act, choosing otherwise was 
indeed always a “genuine, live option.”
Objection 2
Another way Molinists might object to the neo-Molinist’s use of the 
counterfactual square of opposition is by pointing out that the neo-Molinist’s 
assumption that would-counterfactuals negate opposing might-counterfac-
tuals requires the neo-Molinist metaphysic to be unduly fatalistic. For ex-
ample, if the truth of “I would order a pizza” means that the subjunctive 
“I might not order a pizza” is false, this would seem to suggest that it’s not 
37. Thomas Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate,” in Molinism, 38.
38. Lewis, “Postscripts to ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,’” 64.
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possible for me to refrain from ordering a pizza. So, I must order a pizza. But 
that’s absurd, the Molinist will claim, for we are supposed to be talking about 
conditionals of freedom. Recall that Craig made a similar complaint above 
concerning the logical relations on the open future square of opposition. “In 
normal English,” he wrote, 
the statement that something will occur, but might not occur, is per-
fectly coherent. That is just to affirm that it will occur contingently. 
Boyd must be assuming that ‘will’ statements are disguised modal 
statements to the effect that something ‘must’ occur and so can be set 
in opposition to ‘might’ statements.39
The idea, then, is that in order for the contradictory relations on the above 
squares of opposition to have any metaphysical import, open theists have 
to assume two things: future-tense indicatives are actually modal, and the 
relevant modality in question is that of necessity.
Reply
As we’ve already seen, like the traditional Molinist, the neo-Molinist 
does indeed want to suggest that future-tense indicatives are related to modal 
statements. Specifically, they want to maintain that the “will” statements that 
make up God’s free knowledge are logically preceded by and were once ap-
prehended as “would” statements in God’s middle knowledge. So, the state-
ment “Johnny will order a pizza” was logically preceded by “Johnny would 
order a pizza” which, on the Lewisian semantics, means that “Johnny might 
not order a pizza” is false. Does this mean that it’s impossible for Johnny to 
refrain from ordering a pizza? No. The Molinist complaint here fails to take 
into consideration a point they were so eager to bring forward in the previ-
ous objection—that is, that modality comes in varying degrees and strengths. 
The neo-Molinist will insist that even though it’s not the case that Johnny 
might not order a pizza, still, he could refrain from ordering a pizza. Such a 
thing after all is logically possible. Johnny could have done other than order 
out, but the worlds in which he refrains from dialing for delivery are less 
similar to and, hence, more distant from the actual world than those worlds 
in which Johnny orders his pie. Therefore, the neo-Molinist needn’t assume 
that either “necessarily, Johnny will order a pizza” or “necessarily, Johnny 
would order a pizza” are true since they can happily acknowledge that he 
doesn’t order a pizza in every possible world he happens to inhabit.40
However the neo-Molinist will be quick to point out that, while Johnny 
does not do what he does of necessity, this fact is not, in and of itself, enough 
39. Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” 229.
40. I’m speaking loosely here; I don’t mean to be making any metaphysical commitments 
concerning counterpart theory, modal realism, etc.
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to secure the sorts of goods theistic libertarians typically think genuine free 
will affords. For instance, in order to be genuinely free and, thus, ultimately 
responsible for an action in a way that is God exonerating, the neo-Molinist 
will argue that we need a kind of freedom that will rule out the possibility of 
manipulation. Manipulation scenarios, as Robert Kane has suggested, can be 
cases of “nonconstraining control,” whereby
the controllers do not get their way by constraining or coercing others 
against their wills, but rather by manipulating the wills of others so 
that the others (willingly) do what the controllers desire. The con-
trolled agents consequently do not feel frustrated or thwarted. They 
act in accordance with their own wants, desires or intentions. Yet they 
are controlled nevertheless by others who have manipulated their cir-
cumstances so that they want, desire, or intend only what the control-
lers have planned.41
Recently, Dean Zimmerman has argued that exactly this sort of control 
is possible for the God of traditional Molinism.42 And, in his response to 
Zimmerman, Craig has revealed that the traditional Molinist should have 
no problem with such cases of control. Here’s how Craig summarizes the 
objection:
[The worry is that] . . . given that the circumstances C are non-deter-
mining, it must be a brute, contingent fact how [some agent] S would 
choose in C. But then it is plausible that there are an indefinite number 
of circumstances C* that differ from C in imperceptible or causally ir-
relevant ways (for example, a different stellar event in Alpha Centauri 
at the same time of S’s decision), in which S would choose differently 
than in C. So God by placing S in one of these circumstances C* could 
bring it about that S choose freely whatever God wishes without any 
deleterious impact upon God’s providential plan.43
To be sure, Craig objects to this argument in numerous places, but what’s 
important to note is this: he contends that even if such control were possible 
and utilized by God, we would still be free in the relevant sense. As he puts it,
What is the import of such an objection? It does nothing, I think, to 
undermine the Molinist account of providence as such. In particular, it 
does not in any way undermine the freedom of the creatures in what-
ever circumstances they find themselves, for their choices are in every 
case causally undetermined. If a choice is freely made in C, then it 
would be freely made in C* which includes some causally irrelevant 
event not included in C. If God places S in C, then S’s freedom is not 
41. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
65.
42. Zimmerman, “Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument,” in Metaphysics and the Good: 
Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. Samuel Newlands and Larry M. 
Jorgensen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 33–94.
43. Craig, “Yet Another Failed Anti-Molinist Argument,” in Molinism, 145.
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compromised by the mere fact that had God placed S in C* instead, S 
would have chosen differently.44
Craig, however, seems here to have overlooked a subtly important im-
plication of this objection: even if it could be argued that S’s freedom is 
in no way compromised in the above scenario, God’s character potentially 
would be. For suppose that, unlike S’s choice in C*, S’s choice in C is one 
for which S will be held morally blameworthy. By purposely placing S in C 
rather than C*, God would be deliberately bypassing an avenue—an avenue 
readily open to both him and S—in which S freely chose the good, and then 
punishing S for it. Hardly the behavior of a just and benevolent being! But, 
of course, it is exactly situations like this that occur on compatibilist concep-
tions of freedom and are why libertarians find such conceptions of freedom 
so objectionable. For given compatibilism, it is the case that for every C in 
which S sins, God could have determined instead that S freely not sin. This 
is possible after all since, on this account of freedom, freedom and determin-
ism are understood to be compatible. Hence libertarian theists reject such 
accounts of freedom, not because compatibilist accounts of freedom can’t 
be given, but because such accounts allow for morally problematic views of 
God.45 Compatibilists offer an account of freedom in which the agent, from 
the libertarian’s perspective anyway, is not acting in a way that gets God 
sufficiently “off the hook.” So, the agent is not ultimately responsible in the 
sense relevant to theistic libertarians outlined above.
Thus while Craig and other Molinists formally deny compatibilism, giv-
en the relatively broad reading of possibility they endorse, their understand-
ing of what counts as a free choice nevertheless leaves room, in principle, for 
God to act in similarly objectionable ways. And to that degree at least, such 
a conception of freedom is one that many libertarians, including the neo-
Molinist, will find troubling.46 It is for this reason, then, that the neo-Molinist 
adopts the more restricted notion of possibility available on Lewis’s standard 
account of “might” when thinking about libertarian free action. For it is the 
ability to do other than what we actually do, not just in some possible world 
or other, but in the exact same circumstances that we are in that allows us 
the kind of God exonerating freedom that so many theistic libertarians are 
intuitively after. 
44. Ibid.
45. For a trenchant analysis of the problematic nature compatibilist conceptions of freedom 
pose for God’s character, see Jerry L. Walls’s excellent article, “Why No Classical Theist, Let 
Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist,” Philosophia Christi 13 (2011): 
75–104.
46. Interestingly, the Reformed theologian Dennis Jowers has also recognized this very 
point. “William Lane Craig,” Jowers observes, “sets forth a conception of freedom that sharply 
diverges from Boyd and resembles in important respects the conception ordinarily advocated by 
Calvinists” (see Jowers, “Conclusion,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, 247).
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Objection 3
After having finally been confronted with the aforementioned incompat-
ibility between the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics (and the trouble it can pose for 
their conception of middle knowledge), traditional Molinists often simply 
reject the standard counterfactual semantics as being “inadequate” to the task 
of analyzing CCFs.47 Once again, Craig’s response is representative:
[O]bjections to middle knowledge based on its alleged incompatibility 
with the possible worlds account of . . . counterfactuals strike me as 
very unimpressive. That account was drafted without any consider-
ation of the peculiar situations engendered by theism . . . or middle 
knowledge. The account may simply be inadequate for the concerns 
of the philosopher of religion. In fact, I think it is evident that the 
possible worlds semantics for counterfactual conditionals is defective, 
for that account cannot adequately handle counterfactuals with impos-
sible antecedents.48
Reply
Such a retort is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. In the first place, 
the supposed difficulty for standard possible world semantics posed by coun-
terfactuals with “impossible antecedents” (that is, counterpossibles) that 
Craig cites is, as Wierenga has demonstrated, easily resolved. Specifically, 
one can avoid such difficulties and continue to accept Lewis’s interdefinable 
account of the counterfactual operators by adopting the following modifica-
tion of Lewis’s definition: (P ◇→ Q) ≡ ¬(P □→ ¬Q) ∨ (P □→ Q).49
Second, and more importantly, in light of his above complaint concern-
ing Boyd’s understanding of might-conditionals, Craig’s response here re-
garding the use of possible worlds semantics is rather strange. For if the 
customary semantics for counterfactual conditionals are, as Craig states, 
ultimately inadequate, one wonders why he would attempt to object to the 
neo-Molinist’s understanding of might CCFs based on an alleged misunder-
standing of these semantics. Such an objection seems to imply that a correct 
understanding would serve to support Craig’s position (or at least fail to sup-
port the neo-Molinist position). But it does nothing of the sort.50 As I’ve tried 
47. This, for instance, is Kowalski’s recommendation. See his “On Behalf of a Suarezian 
Middle Knowledge,” 225.
48. Craig, “Hasker on Divine Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 67 (1992): 103.
49. Wierenga, “Theism and Counterpossibles,” Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 94.
50. Despite what Mares and Perszyk argue (“Molinist Conditionals,” 104–5), Lewis’s stan-
dard account of “might” does not allow the Molinist to say there are worlds that are feasible for 
creatures to get to but unavailable to God. For while it is true that, given Molinist assumptions, 
Adam (somehow) has counterfactual power over the true CCFs about him, this does not mean 
that it was open to Adam to get to a world, say, in which he refrained from eating the forbidden 
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to show in this essay, in arriving at her view the neo-Molinist is observing 
and maintaining the standard distinctions between Stalnaker and Lewis’s ac-
tual formal semantics for counterfactuals. And it is because of these distinc-
tions that, from the neo-Molinist’s point of view, the truth of some conjoined 
might-counterfactuals is, given libertarian freedom, much more plausible 
than the validity of CEM. Since the neological stages in God’s knowledge 
provide a coherent alternative to the traditional Molinist account, therefore, 
the above argument not only shows how one could move from Molinism 
to neo-Molinism, it shows why a libertarian might actually want to do so.51
Stage Truths Known Modal Status Relation to God’s Activity
Natural knowledge What “must” (“must 
not”), “could” 
(“could not”) be . . . .
Necessary Independent, prevo-
litional
Middle knowledge What “would,” 
“would not,” and 
“might and might 
not” be . . . .
Counterfactual 
Square of Opposi-
tion (fig. 3)
Contingent Dependent, precre-
ational
God decides to bring 
creaturely essences 
into being by willing 
their existence and 
gifting the power of 
contrary choice to 
such essences.
God’s creative act 
of will
What parameters and 
contingency plans 
are in place . . . .
Contingent Dependent
God instantiates 
creaturely essences 
endowed with free 
will.
Free knowledge What “will,” “will 
not,” and “might and 
might not” be . . . .
Open Future Square 
of Opposition (fig. 1)
Contingent Dependent, postcre-
ational
God works toward 
his creational goals 
within the context of 
the parameters and 
contingency plans 
he’s put in place 
for each individual 
creature.
Figure 4. Neological Stages in God’s Knowledge
fruit. In order for Adam to have actually refrained from doing what he in fact did, God would 
have had to been presented with a different CCF. But this doesn’t get Adam to a world in which 
he passes on his wife’s offer. In order to get to that world, God has to place (i.e., instantiate) 
Adam in the relevant circumstances. And whether God decides to do this is not up to Adam at 
all. Indeed, the transition of any true “would” CCF into a true future-tense indicative proposi-
tion is effected by God’s creative decree. On the traditional Molinist scheme, therefore, it is 
ultimately God who decides what we will do, not us.
51. Many thanks to Betty Talbert for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
